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suggestions.1. Introduction
This paper seeks to identify the determinants  of the private, community-based  provision of a public
good, in this case, trash collection. The community aspect is vitally important here since trash collection
involves positive externalities leading to limited incentives  for individual  action. Also, trash collection is an
activity in which individual action does not have much impact, so collective action is warranted. Why are
some communities  better able to organize themselves for the collective good than others? Given the same
impetus,  what particular characteristics of the community lead to activism in some neighborhoods and none
in others?
The context for this work is the fact that households in some neighborhoods of Dhaka, Bangladesh,
have organized themselves  to arrange for private collection of trash. The garbage collection system in
Dhaka involves municipal pick-up from large dumpsters placed in central areas, with municipal workers
responsible for collecting trash from smaller dumpsters located in alleys and side streets and transporting it
to the main dumpsters. However, municipal employees are unreliable and frequently fail to collect the trash
on a regular basis.  In response, some communities have hired private contractors to undertake local trash
collection funded by voluntary contributions from community members. Since other, apparently similar,
neighborhoods have not managed  to successfully  organize an alternative to the municipal service, a natural
question is why some communities or neighborhoods display such initiative while others do not.
We conjecture  that "social capital" is a critical determinant of such collective action, where we
equate social capital with community cohesiveness or the resources that exist in social relationships. The
cohesiveness of the community is, in turn, a function of factors like customary  or traditional interactions and
institutions, a common  heritage, ethnic or religious  background, etc. Using data obtained from a survey of
neighborhoods in Dhaka,  we examine the importance  of these potential determinants of social capital in the
establishment of voluntary solid waste management (VSWM) systems as described above. We view the
creation of these systems as a direct benefit of collective action, which is a function of the social capital in
the neighborhood.
If social capital has economic value, then it should be particularly effective in supporting
cooperation to overcome the free-rider problem in the private provision of public goods. However, the role
of social capital in this setting has not been subjected to much rigorous quantitative analysis. This study  is
an effort in that direction. In addition, we compare  the role of social capital in explaining private provision
of public goods to that of more traditional explanatory variables such as education, group size, and income.
The empirical approach employed accounts  for a number of issues brought on by the underlying
process of cooperation  for public good provision  and by the data itself. We use measures of trust and of the
strength of norms of reciprocity and sharing among neighborhood residents as proxies for social capital in a
probit regression explaining the probability that a neighborhood has created a VSWM system. However,  theprocess of organizing the community to support the trash disposal scheme may, in itself, contribute to our
indicators of social capital.  In order to account for this source of simultaneity, we estimate a system of
equations with endogenous variables including the measures of social capital and a discrete indicator of
VSWM system presence. We implement this simultaneous equations system with both continuous and
discrete endogenous variables following the approach of Rivers and Vuong (1988).1 Consistent estimation
also requires that we account for the sampling procedure used in collecting the data. Because there were
only 55 neighborhoods in Dhaka with a VSWM system in place at the time of the survey, neighborhoods
were selected in a choice based sample stratified on the presence of a VSWM system to increase the number
of VSWM systems in our sample and improve the precision of the parameter estimates. In order to remove
the inconsistency caused by this sampling technique, we reweight the observations in the VSWM probit
using the techniques of Manski and Lerman (1977).
Our results show that social capital is, indeed, an important determinant of whether VSWM systems
arise in Dhaka. The effects of norms of reciprocity and sharing on the probability that a VSWM system is
created are relatively large and significant, while the role of trust is not identified as a significant factor.
Other measures of homogeneity of interests are also important, and, interestingly, so is the nature of
associational activity. Finally, education levels are strongly and robustly associated with the existence of
collective action for trash disposal.
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In section 2 we briefly describe the literature on social
capital relevant to this study. We describe our modeling and empirical estimation strategy in sections 3 and
4, and our survey and data in sections 5 and 6.  We present our empirical results and discuss their
implications in section 7.  Section 8 concludes.
2. Social capital
The term 'social capital' has been applied to a variety of ideas that generally concern economic
returns from networks of social relationships.  While there has been limited work in economics on providing
a theoretical context for social capital, there is a growing empirical literature that identifies considerable
economic returns to networks of social relationships, to trust and norms of reciprocity, and to institutions
that foster civic engagement.
'This approach  was also  chosen  over  other  available  methods  because  it has  been shown  to provide  more  efficient
estimation  in small  samples. Our sample  consists  of 65 neighborhoods  from  Dhaka.
2Social capital first gained popularity and analytical teeth from James S. Coleman's works (1988,
1990). Citing Loury's (1977) definition of social capital as "the set of resources that inhere in family
relations and in community social organization..." (1990, p. 300), Coleman sees social capital as the "social
relationships which come into existence when individuals attempt to make best use of their individual
resources" (1990, p. 300).
Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement  of
certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like physical capital and human
capital, social capital is not completely  fungible, but is fungible with respect to specific
activities.... Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations
between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals  nor in physical
implements of production. (1990, p. 302)
While Coleman stresses social capital as resources that accrue to individuals, Putnam (1993)
popularized a definition of social capital as resources that can characterize societies:  "Social capital here
refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency
of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, p. 167). Putnam is concerned not only with the role of
social capital in economic development,  but also with its role in forming democratic societies. Thus, the
strength of social capital within a society is represented in the intensity of 'civic engagement' found there.
Putnam argued that the quantity and intensity of individual  membership in social and professional
associations is a good indicator of social capital. This indicator has been used by many researchers to test
the benefits of social capital (see Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), Helliwell and
Putnam (1995), Meyerson (1994), and Boxman, De Graaf and Flap (1991), for example).
Social networks can be characterized as primarily 'horizontal', in which individuals share relatively
equal status and power, or primarily 'vertical,' with asymmetric relationships based on hierarchy and
dependence. Putnam argues that horizontal networks such as "neighborhood associations, choral societies,
cooperatives, sports clubs, mass-based  parties, and the like" (1993, p. 173) are the building blocks of
'networks of civic engagement.'  These networks are "an essential form of social capital: the denser such
networks in a community,  the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit"
(1993, p. 173). We empirically test the importance of these networks in fostering cooperation for public
good provision below. 2 In addition, Putnam notes that trust and reciprocity to sustain civic networks (i.e.,
2 For Coleman,  social  capital,  though  not embodied  in individuals,  is a capital  asset  whose  benefits  are best  measured  at
the individual  level. However,  Putnam  treats  the aggregation  of social  networks  as representing  the social  capital  of a
society.  In a critique  of Putnam,  Harriss  and  De Renzio  (1997)  question  whether  this  type of 'scaling  up' is consistent
with  the idea  of the strength  of social  ties as a form  of capital. In particular,  because  social  organization  can also  be
used  to exclude  others  from  economic  benefits  or for  rent-seeking  as noted  by Olson  (1982),  the aggregate  gain  from
summing  individuals'  benefits  from  social  interaction  may  be ambiguous.  While  we find  Coleman's  articulation  of
social  capital  more  consistent  with  economic  theories  of human  capital  development,  for example,  we refer  in our
3social capital) are self-reinforcing because as these networks become more dense the costs of opportunistic
or selfish behavior increase. 3 This implies endogeneity in regressions that attempt to explain a product of
social capital with some measure of trust or reciprocity, for instance.
There are several mechanisms through which social capital might affect economic outcomes.
Repeated interaction by economic actors through social networks strengthens trust and lowers information
asymmetries, thus lowering transaction costs and increasing the enforceability of contracts.  Two of the most
thorough empirical investigations of the economic benefits of social capital look directly at the role of social
capital in income generation, one at the household level and the other in cross-country comparisons.
Following Putnam, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) measure social capital using involvement in civic and
professional associations and show that at both the household and village level, social capital is a significant
determinant of income for a sample of households in Tanzania. 4 In order to remove the potential
endogeneity of social capital due to simultaneous effects of income on associational activity (which would
result if social capital were a consumption good), the authors instrument for social capital using indicators of
trust from survey questions. 5
In a cross-country empirical study, Knack and Keefer (1997) show that social capital matters for
economic growth, using indicators of trust and of civic cooperation as direct measures of social capital.
They deal with the potential endogeneity of social capital in their regressions of economic performance by
using performance data that is subsequent to the measures of trust and civic cooperation.  Testing the
importance of Putnam's horizontal networks by measuring the effect of associational activity on trust, civic
cooperation, and economic growth, they find no relationship between associational life and these measures.
Studies on the role of social capital in fostering public good provision are rare.  The most closely
related literature concerns the conditions for collective action in management of common property resources
(see, for example, Ostrom (1990, 1996), Baland and Platteau (1996, 1997), White and Runge (1994), and De
Janvry, McCarthy, and Sadoulet (1998)).  A more relevant exception is Beall (1996) where case studies are
presented of cooperative action for the provision of solid waste management (SWM).  In Bangalore, India,
Beall found free riding and caste considerations undermined the effort of horizontal associations of NGOs to
organize neighbourhood based SWM. In Faisalabad, Pakistan, Beall found that poorer communities were
analysis  to neighborhood  social  capital. By this  we mean  no more  than  the average  level  of trust  or strength  of norms  of
reciprocity  benefitting  individuals  in a given  neighborhood.
3 A number  of studies-both theoretical  and empirical-consider  the economic  benefits  of trust  (Fukuyama  (1995),
Narayan  and  Pritchett  (1999),  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)),  norms  of reciprocity  (Sugden  (1984, 1986)),  culture  (Harrison
(1992),  Greif  (1994)),  and  ethnicity  (Borjas  (1992, 1995))  either  as (sometimes  implicit)  determinants  of or proxies  for
social  capital.
4Household  social  capital  is measured  by the number  of associations  to which  respondents  belong,  with  membership
weighted  by the quality  of the association  in  raising  social  capital.  The latter  is measured  by characteristics  of the
associations  and  the respondents'  assessment  of the trust  and social  cohesion  in the group  (including  kin heterogeneity,
income  heterogeneity,  group  functioning,  group  decision  making,  and  voluntary  membership).  Village-level  social
capital  is defined  as the product  of the average  number  of groups  per household  times  the average  group  characteristics.
4sometimes able to gain access to public services by offering their neighborhoods as vote banks, guaranteeing
support at the polls in exchange for electricity, sewerage and the like. In Pakistan, it was vertical rather than
horizontal networks between neighborhood leaders and politicians that enabled the provision of public
goods by the government. 6
3. Modeling the development of VSWM systems
We explain the role of social capital in the formation of a VSWM system using a threshold model of
public good provision following Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993).  We assume that initiators propose the
creation of a VSWM system  to neighborhood  residents for their consideration.  The initiators will form the
neighborhood VSWM system only if a large enough number of households decides to participate. 7
Individual households undertake a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to join the proposed system,
recognizing the impact of their decision on the probability of the system coming into being. Our fieldwork
surrounding data collection indicates that this analytical context for VSWM system formation is a good
representation of the actual process occurring in the neighborhoods of Dhaka.
Let N be the number of households in the neighborhood, and n the threshold, i.e., the number of
participating households necessary for VSWM system formation. Let the cost per household of
participation, c, be declining in k, the level of neighborhood social capital, (c'(k) < O)  due to increased ease
of coordination and easier flow of knowledge as social capital increases. The private benefits to household i
of trash disposal, bi, are augmented by the household's social capital, ki, so that total private benefits from
joining the VSWM system are B(k 1, b, ).s  The effect of household social capital on total private benefits
from joining the VSWM system depends on the nature of social norms in the neighborhood. If norms of
reciprocity are strong, we expect that households with stronger ties in the community (higher ki) earn greater
(net) rewards for their cooperation by reinforcing their standing and from the act of participating in a
community initiative (B 1 (ki, bi  ) > 0).  We can assume that these benefits are additive in ki and bi, so that if,
for example, reciprocity norms are well developed households with strong ties in the neighborhood but low
concern for public cleanliness may earn as much direct benefit from joining the system as a household of
5 This  is consistent  with  Fukuyarna's  (1995)  notion  that  trust, in  part,  determines  the effectiveness  of social  capital.
6 An inportant  insight  of Beall'  s work  is that, in  the rush  to decentralize  government,  many  have  turned  to social  capital
as a potential  mechanism  for  the private  provision  of public  goods. Attempts  to tack additional  services,  such  as security
details  or health  committees,  onto  existing  local  cooperative  efforts  may  fail  because  they  ignore  the characteristics  of
the problem  that  originally  caused  people  to organize.
' In order  for  the proposed  project  to be viable,  a minimum  number  of households  is required  in  order  to cover  fixed
costs  associated  with  operating  the system  (such  as the purchase  of a cart  to transport  the trash).
s Here,  household  social  capital,  ki,  is restricted  to the social  capital  that  exists  in  the household's  relationships  with
other  households  in its neighborhood,  whereas  neighborhood  social  capital,  k, is a measure  of the average  social  capital
of all households  in  the neighborhood.
5environmentally  conscious  members  that does  not have  close  neighborhood  ties. We also assume  that
B(k 1 , b ) < c(k) for all i = 1,..., N so that no household  is willing  to act alone.
In addition,  the benefits  of trash removal  as a public  good  are assumed  to be linear  in the number  of
households  that enroll in the system,  so that a household  receives  an additional  benefit  equal  to bi  for each
other  household  that  joins up. Thus,  if r other  households  join, the ith  household's  benefits  are augmented
by bir.  The probability  that r other  households  will  join the system  is given  by Pr(rl  N-1,  k),  which is a
function  of the number  of other  households  in the neighborhood,  N-  1,  and k, the level  of neighborhood
social  capital. The  VSWM  system  will only come  into  being  if r>n. 9
Households  are assumed  to act non-strategically,  taking  the decisions  of other  households  as given.
The ith household  will commit  to participating  if the expected  benefits  from  taking  part exceed  the expected
gains from free-riding  if the VSWM  system  is formed:
N-l  N-l  N-l
(1)  bi ,rPr(r  I N-1,k)+[B(ki,bi)-c(k)]  Pr(r  I  N-l,k)>b 1yrPr(r  I  N-1,k).
r=n-I  r=n-I  r=n
The first term above  represents  the expected  benefits  to the ith household  of at least n-I other  households
agreeing  to join the VSWM  system  when  the ith household  joins, so that  the system  is formed  and trash is
collected  (the public  good  element). The second  term represents  the direct  expected  net benefits  to the ith
household  of its own contribution.  The  term to the right  of the inequality  is the expected  (non-excludable)
benefits  to the ith household  assuming  that it decides  not to join but the VSWM system  is formed  anyway.
Rewriting  the participation  constraint  clarifies  the tradeoff  between  free-riding  and participation
faced  by each  household  in its decision  to join. The ith household  will agree  to join if the expected  public-
good benefit  from  being  the critical  nth vote  exceeds  the expected  net cost of agreeing  to join before  it is
known  if the system  will form.1 0
N-i
(2)  b,(n -1)Pr(n -l  | N-1,k)>  [c(k) -B(k,,bi)],Pr(r  j N-1,k).
r=n-I
The probability  of a VSWM  system  being  formed  in neighborhoodj  is the probability  that at least  n
households  agree  to participate.  Let r be the number  of households  that agree  to join. Defining  yj =I if a
VSWM  system  is formed  in neighborhoodj,  andyj =0 otherwise,
(3)  Pr(y,  = I) = Pr(r > n) = E  Pr(r  I N, p, (ki  )  PN  (kN  ) 
r=n
9  As households  do  not  observe  the  threshold  for  the  existence  of a VSWM  system,  we  assume  it  is exogeneous.
'°  Many  of the  VSWM  systems  in Dhaka  provide  two  services,  collection  of trash  from  household  bins  and  removal
from  centralized  neighborhood  bins.  The  latter  service  is clearly  a neighborhood  public  good.  Although  trash  collection
at  the  household  is a private  good,  when  the  trash  is not  collected  regularly  it  often  ends  up in public  areas  such  as
streets  and  vacant  lots. The  model  developed  here  focuses  on  the  public  good  component  of  these  services.
6where pi (ki )  is the probability of the ith household joining the VSWM system, i.e., the probability that the
participation constraint in (1) is satisfied for the ith household:
N-1  N-1  N-1
(4) Pi(ki)  = Pr  b  E  rPr(r  I N -I,k)+[B(ki,bi)-c(k)],Pr(r  I N -l,k)  > b,ErPr(r  I  N -l,k
r=n-l  r=n-I  r=n
This suggests a probit model of neighborhood cooperation in which the latent variable, y;,  measures the
intensity of cooperation for public good provision in thejth neighborhood.  In the next section, we describe
the empirical implementation of this model.
Obviously household benefits from the VSWM systems are not observed and the costs are known
only in neighborhoods where the system exists. However, under our assumption of non-strategic behavior in
which householdj does not take account of the decision process of household i, an increase in pi (ki)  for an
arbitrary household increases the probability of VSWM system formation in (3).  Thus, (3) and (4) can be
used to identify how a number of other variables affect the probability of such systems coming into being.' 1
For example, if information costs are increasing in the number of households in the neighborhood or
if coordinated action is simply more difficult as the number of actors increases, then the probability of
VSWM system formation will be decreasing in the number of households in the neighborhood.  On the other
hand, a larger neighborhood implies a larger potential set of participants, so that a given threshold, n, may be
easier to reach in larger neighborhoods. Education could increase the probability of cooperation if it
increases the perceived benefits of environmental improvements. However, more-educated individuals may
be more or less likely to cooperate for other reasons, depending on the nature of their education. Income
may have little direct effect on the probability of cooperation, but it may proxy for other variables that can
affect the costs and benefits ofjoining  a VSWM system. At higher income levels, the actual cost of joining
a VSWM system  may represent a very small share of total expenditure suggesting that it would be easier for
these households to join.  However, we suspect that higher income neighborhoods have better municipal
trash removal services due to greater influence with local politicians (a form of social capital not captured in
our survey), so that the benefits from a VSWM system will be lower in these neighborhoods. Variables for
each of these determinants of cooperation are included in the neighborhood probit below.
Given the general formulation of (3) and (4), it is not possible to determine the effect of social
capital on the probability that a VSWM system will form.  Without making strong distributional
assumptions on  Pr(r I N -1, k),  it is impossible to sign unambiguously a[Pr(r  I  N -1, k)]/Ok  and therefore
' We model  the probability  of a neighborhood  forming  a VSWM  system  as a function  of household  level  social  capital
and other  household  characteristics.  However,  we are unable  to empirically  estimate  the household's  decision  to  join a
proposed  VSWM  system  because  the data do not include  enough  variation  in  household  decisions  within  neighborhood
samples  defined  by the presence  of a VSWM  system. In neighborhoods  with  community  organized  trash disposal
groups  in our  sample  nearly  all respondents  are members,  while  we do not observe  the outcome  of household  decisions
7to sign a[Pr(yj = 1)j/ak.  However,  the effect of individual  and neighborhood  social  capital  on the private
costs and benefits  of  joining the VSWM  system  are more  clear. As noted  above,  an increase  in
neighborhood  social  capital  reduces  the costs c(k)  of participating  in collective  activity. In addition,
household  social  capital  may  increase  the direct  benefits B(k,  , bi  ) of participation  if norms  of reciprocity
are strong. Both  of these  effects  lower  the expected  net private  costs of participation  in (2), thereby
increasing  the probability  that the household  will  join, p, (k,).  While  the effect of an increase  in social
capital  on the probabilities  Pr(r I  N -1, k) depend  critically  on the distributional  assumptions,  our
hypothesis  is that the reduction  in individual  net costs  ofjoining from increased  social  capital is a significant
determinant  of the probability  of VSWM  system  formation.
4. Estimation  strategy
We model  the probability  that a neighborhood  in Dhaka  will organize  a VSWM  system  as a function
of contemporaneous  and predetermined  measures  of neighborhood  social  capital  and other  neighborhood-
specific  variables. Contemporaneous  social capital  is proxied  by indicators  of the level of trust and strength
of norms  of reciprocity  and sharing. However,  these  measures  of social  capital  are simultaneously
determined  with the establishment  of a VSWM  system  since  the process  of developing  a VSWM  system  can
strengthen  social  networks,  may  encourage  participation  in other  civic  and social  organizations,  and can
build  trust and reinforce  norms  of reciprocity. In order  to account  for the joint determination  of cooperation
for creation  of a VSWM  system  and social  capital,  we estimate  a simultaneous  equations  system  with both
discrete  and continuous  endogenous  variables  using  the two-stage  conditional  maximum  likelihood
(2SCML)  estimation  procedure  developed  by Rivers  and Vuong  (1988).
Our simultaneous  equations  model  includes  an equation,  (5.a), for each of the three
contemporaneous  continuous  measures  of social  capital  plus a probit  regression,  (5.b), explaining  the
probability  that the neighborhood  has organized  a VSWM  system. The ith  observation  in the system  is:
(5.a)  Y, = y  * a + Xl',] + U,
(-.a) y*XP11  +  where  i=1,...,n.
(5.b)  y.  =YY+X2,f+iU,
Here, Y, representing  social  capital  is a 3 x 1  vector,  XI, and X2 , are  p x l and k x 1 vectors  of exogeneous
variables,  and a, F, y, and ,B  are 3 x 1, p x 3, 3 x 1, and k x 1 matrices  of coefficients,  respectively.  The
variable  y* represents  latent  strength  of cooperation  for community-organized  trash disposal  in the ith
on  proposed  VSWM  systems  in neighborhoods  without  them.  Therefore,  we  focus  only  on  neighborhood  level
outcomes  in  the  estimation.
8neighborhood. Although cooperation is unobserved,  we observe whether or not a VSWM system exists,
which we represent by the binary variable, y1, defined as
y=I  if  Y* >°0 yi=  if  >
Yi = 0  otherwise.
Equations (5.a) include three social capital regressions with observations on n neighborhoods.
Neighborhood social capital is determined by the (endogenous) presence of a VSWM system, the
professional and tenurial status of neighborhood residents, regional origin of residents, local infrastructure,
and number of pre-existing civic organizations. Equation (5.b) is a probit regression of neighborhood
cooperation for provision of the VSWM system public good with endogenous social capital.  The degree of
cooperation is conditioned on the three contemporaneous social capital variables, the number of households
in the neighborhood, income and education levels, the ratio of homeowners to tenants, number of pre-
existing civic organizations and the distribution of professions among neighborhood residents.
Maximum likelihood estimation of systems with discrete and continuous endogenous variables as in
(5) is generally only feasible in systems of low order because of computational difficulties.  As a result, two-
stage estimation procedures are often used, such as those developed by Heckman (1978) and Amemiya
(1978). Because the Dhaka sample consists of only 65 neighborhood observations, finding an efficient
estimator of equations (5) is critical.  We employ the 2SCML procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988)
because Monte Carlo results demonstrate that it outperforms the Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978)
approaches in small samples. A demonstration of the relationship of the Rivers and Vuong (1988) estimator
to the approaches of Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978) for generating consistent parameter estimates of
(7) is provided in Note A.  1 of Appendix A.
Following Rivers and Vuong (1988) we rewrite equation (5.b) in the form
(6)  Yi =  y,' +  X2i3 + Vj/ +  Vi,  where ;i  = u, - Vi'2  .
Here, Vi  is the 3 x 1 vector of residuals from the reduced form social capital regressions
(5.a')  Yi =  x  i 12
An appropriate normalization for this system is 0  - u=  1,  where  Z,, is the covariance matrix of
residuals Vi. Estimation of the conditional ML probit regression then takes place in two steps. First, we
estimate the reduced form social capital regressions to obtain *  and  v,  whose diagonal elements are
12 The  matrix Xi  in the reduced  form  social  capital  equations  has  as columns  all of the exogenous  variables  in  system
(5). It is related  to the matrices  of exogenous  regressors  in equations  (5.a)  and (5.b)  by the identities  Xi-  J,X,  and
X2 i  =  J2X,,  where J1 and J 2 are the selection  matrices  of ones  and  zeros  that  retrieve X 11 and X2, , respectively.
9n  A
estimated  by ,4  E  Vi  Vjwhere V, =Y  - fl'X  . Next,  we estimate  the probit  regression  for (6)
i=l
substituting  Vi for Vi to obtain (y,  fi,  A).  Standard  errors  of parameter  estimates  are taken from  the
asymptotic  covariance  matrix for  this estimator  described  in Rivers  and Vuong  (1988,  p. 355).
An advantage  of the Rivers  and Vuong  procedure  is that it is possible  to develop  a simple  Wald
statistic  from  parameter  estimates  for A to test for exogeneity  of the social  capital  variables  in the
cooperation  probit. The details of this hypothesis  test are provided  in Note A.2 of Appendix  A.
In estimation  of the social  capital  equations,  (5.a),  Hausman  tests for exogeneity  based  on.original
least squares  estimates  do not allow  us to reject  (at 5% significance)  the exogeneity  of the existence  of
VSWM  systems. 13 However,  the inverse  power  function  test developed  by Andrews  (1989)  indicates  that
the power  of these Hausman  tests for the exogeneity  of VSWM  system  presence  is quite low, probably
because  there are so few observations.  Therefore,  we re-estimate  the social capital  regressions  treating
VSWM  system  presence  as endogenous,  following  Amemiya  (1978).
Let the reduced  form equation  for cooperation  for the creation  of a VSWM  system  take the form
(5.b')  yI  =  fl'X,  +  ±
Amemiya  (1  978) shows  that structural  parameters  (akI rk  )  from  the kth social  capital equation  in (5.a) can
be recovered  by the following  regression  (in matrix  notation)  of reduced  form parameter  estimates  from
equations  (5.a')  on reduced  form  parameter  estimates  from (5.b') and the selection  matrix  J.,
(7)  *k  =  flalk  +  J1r7k+q1
where 71 = (*k  - kj)-  a(Hi  - fi)  and subscript k denotes the columns of *I and F  and the row of a
corresponding  to the kth social  capital  regression.
Consistent  estimation  of the VSWM  system  probit  requires  another  modification  to account  for the
approach  used  to identify  sample  neighborhoods  in Dhaka. As discussed  in Section  5 below,  neighborhoods
were selected  using  choice-based  sampling  in which  the population  of neighborhoods  was first stratified
based on whether  or not the neighborhood  has a VSWM  system. Then  neighborhoods  were randomly
selected  from  within  strata. This approach  leads  to biased  parameter  estimates  in probit  estimation  without
correction  for sample  selection.  Manski  and Lerman  (1977)  show  that the inconsistency  is removed  if each
observation's  contribution  to the likelihood  function  is given  the following  weight:
w(i)  = Q(i),  where  i  0,  if the NH does not have a VSWM system-
H(i)  1,  otherwise,
13 Results  of reduced  form  estimation  of the probit regression  used to predict  VSWM  system  presence  for the Hausman
tests  of exogeneity  are presented  in  Appendix  B, Table  B2.
10and where Q(i) is the fraction of the population with VSWM system indicator i and H(i) is the fraction of the
sample with VSWM system indicator i.  This weighting scheme and the corresponding corrections to the
asymptotic covariance matrix of the parameter estimates were used in estimation of equation (5.b).  The
sampling approach itself is discussed in detail in the following section.
5. Data collection
We undertook a survey of voluntary solid waste management practices in Dhaka between November
1997 and January 1998 using a structured questionnaire and interviewing households in sixty-five lower to
upper middle-class neighborhoods of the city. The object of the survey was to collect household- and
neighborhood-level information that would allow us to construct measures of associational activity, trust,
reciprocity and sharing, as well as to learn about neighborhood characteristics that might explain the
establishment of the VSWM systems that exist in some of these neighborhoods.
The survey was confined to the service area of the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) in Dhaka City,
which covers approximately 360 square kilometers. The sample is stratified on whether or not the
neighbourhood has a VSWM system. This choice based sampling technique was adopted to ensure that the
sample would contain "enough" neighborhoods with the relatively rare VSWM systems that our results
would be reliable.  A thorough search turned up 55 neighborhoods with VSWM systems in Dhaka.  An
additional 44 neighborhoods without VSWM systems were identified to comprise a population of 99
neighborhoods out of approximately 1058 neighborhoods in Dhaka. The neighborhoods identified were
thought to be qualitatively representative of other middle-income neighborhoods in the city. From this
subpopulation 35 neighborhoods were randomly drawn from the stratum of neighborhoods with VSWM
systems and 30 neighborhoods were drawn from those without, creating a sample of 65 neighborhoods from
which households were selected for interviews. Within each neighborhood, an average of ten households
was chosen for interviews from among neighborhood residents.
The questionnaire had three modules.  The first module dealt with information regarding the
community such as the number of residents, their districts of origin, mix of homeowners and tenants, age of
the neighborhood, etc.  It also recorded the number of civic and sports associations, frequency of meetings,
membership, etc.  Questions in this module were asked of a knowledgeable neighborhood authority. The
second module gathered information on the households that participated in the survey. Household heads
were asked questions about the income/expenditure, education, age and profession of the members of the
household, as well as questions regarding trust, reciprocity, and sharing, which formed the basis of our
proxies for social capital. The final module, with information about the process of initiating the VSWM
11systems, was asked of the VSWM system initiators in areas with functioning systems, in an attempt to
understand the motivation of VSWM system initiators" 4 and the characteristics of the systems themselves.' 5
6.  Data description and selection of variables
The data set covers sixty-five neighborhoods and 652 households, with ten households on average
from each neighborhood.  The basic unit of analysis is the neighborhood. Table 1 presents summary
statistics of the variables used in our analysis and Table B 1 in Appendix B presents Pearson correlation
coefficients for all pairs of variables. Table 2 provides an illustrative snapshot of the difference in median
levels of these variables in neighborhoods with and without VSWM systems.
The survey provided several measures of social capital. This allows us to test the applicability of
the theories of Coleman and Putnam for public good provision as well as to identify the differential effects
of various types of social capital on cooperation. Following Knack and Keefer (1997) and others, we use a
measure of trust, plus two unique measures of norns  of reciprocity and sharing (based on our questionnaire)
as proxies for social capital.  Our measures for trust, reciprocity, and sharing are based on the neighborhood
mean of the categorical scores of the individual households for the following questions in the questionnaire:
Trust.
I)  Would you hire someone based on your neighbors' recommendations?
2)  In an emergency would you leave your young children with your neighbors?
Reciprocity:
1)  Do you or your neighbors help arrange funerals for someone who dies in the neighborhood?
2)  Do you or your neighbors send food to the family after a death in the family of your neighbors?
3)  Do you or your neighbors help each other in taking sick neighbors to doctors or hospitals?
Sharing:
14 The  two earliest  VSWM  systems  in  Dhaka  were initiated  by individuals  who  had been  exposed  to relatively  more
sanitary  conditions  than  in Dhaka  in the course  of extended  stays  overseas.  They  were  extremely  motivated  and  put in
large  amounts  of their own  time  and money  in an effort  to organize  trash disposal  in  their neighborhoods  and involve
their  neighbors  in the effort. The development  of many  of the newer  systems  was inspired  by these  pioneers,  who  had
received  television  publicity.
15 It is interesting  to note that  in  the neighborhoods  where  VSWM  systems  exist,  participant  households  are charged  a
fixed  monthly  fee,  regardless  of household  size  or quantity  of trash discarded.  This  fee varies  from  $0.20  to $0.60  (with
a median  of $0.30),  with  higher  charges  when  the collected  garbage  needs  to be removed  from  the neighborhood
altogether.  The initial  investment  required  to start  such  a system  appears  to be low,  varying  between  $50.00  and
$600.00,  with  a median  of $280.00. The  minimum  scale  required  is roughly  250  households  according  to the initiators
we interviewed.  While  initiators  noted that  many  people  were  reluctant  to pay for a service  that is considered  to be the
city's responsibility,  some  VSWM  systems  have  operated  profitably.  This  suggests  some scope  for privatization  of trash
collection  in the city, perhaps  with  tax breaks  to neighborhoods  that organize  and  finance  their own  trash collection.
121)  Do you or your neighbors send each other cooked food or sweets during religious and social
festivals or on any happy occasion?
2)  Do you or your neighbors share fruits or vegetables grown on your own premises or at your
village home?
Household responses of "Frequently", "Occasionally", or "Never" were recorded and converted into an
increasing frequency index from 0 to 100 for each question. Household scores for trust, reciprocity and
sharing are the average of the indices for the relevant questions. Neighborhood variables are the mean of the
household scores for each neighborhood.
Table 1. Summary statistics and variable definitions
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Presence  of VSWM  system  in  neighborhood  65  0.54  0.50  0.00  1.00
(dummy)
Average  trust  score in  observed  households  65  24.37  16.05  0.00  71.43
Average  reciprocity  score in  observed  65  73.13  11.40  50.00  95.00
households
Average  sharing  score  in observed  65  69.46  13.58  36.11  97.22
households
Number  of sport,  women's  orgs  in  65  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00
neighborhood  before  VSWM
Number  of religious,  welfare,  neighborhood-  65  0.75  0.77  0.00  3.00
watch,  library  orgs  in neighborhood  before
VSWM
Share  of neighborhood  residents  that are  65  25.64  6.35  16.00  40.00
homeowners  (%)
Number  of households  in neighborhood  65  605.63  352.63  63.00  1500.00
Dummy  for whether  Chittagong  is district  of  65  0.57  0.50  0.00  1.00
origin  of largest  group  of households
Share  of respondents  working  in business  65  23.03  11.30  0.00  50.00
Median  education  of adults  in respondent  65  11.59  1.72  5.50  14.45
households  (years)
Median  monthly  per capita  income  of  65  3394.97  1283.13  1200.00  8267.86
respondents  (Taka)
Number  of centers,  clubs,  fields,  and  meeting  65  0.63  0.98  0.00  4.00
places  in neighborhood
Median  number  of years  respondents  had  65  20.28  13.51  1.50  67.00
lived  in  neighborhood
In addition, we develop measures of activity in civic and social associations, which Putnam argues
can be an important source of social ties that build social capital. Information on associations and the
existence of various community facilities was derived from the non-household interview part of the survey.
We used two variables to proxy the associational depth of the community, both based on the number of
13associations or organizations that had existed prior to the establishment of the VSWM system to ensure
exogeneity with respect to the VSWM system. The first was the number of associations providing a
"4private"  good or service, where we counted sports and women's associations - whose services are typically
available to association members only. The second was the number of organizations providing a "public"
good or service, where we counted welfare associations, neighborhood watches, religious associations' 6, and
library associations.  '  These measures of associational activity act as predetermined explanatory variables
in the VSWM system (cooperation) probit and in the social capital regressions.
Table 2.  Comparison of medians across neighborhoods
with and without VSWM systems in place
Variable  With VSWM  Without VSWM
Neighborhood trust  30.00  16.70
Neighborhood reciprocity  77.50  68.43
Neighborhood sharing  70.45  65.00
Pre-existing private civic assoc.  0  1
Pre-existing public civic assoc.  1  0.5
Proportion of residents who are  27.78  22.02
homeowners
Number of households in  650  502
neighborhood
Chittagong district dummy  1  0
Share of workers in business  20.00  26.82
Median education  12.00  11.22
Median per capita income  3166.67  3237.50
Number of meeting places  0  0
Median tenure of residents  15.50  24.25
Median education of adults and median per capita income were calculated on the basis of household
information collected during the survey. Information on the number of households in the neighborhoods and
the proportion of homeowners among residents was collected during interviews with initiators or
knowledgeable persons from the community. As discussed in Section 3, the expected impact of
neighborhood size, median education, and income on VSWM system development can be either positive or
negative.  We expect the proportion of homeowners to have a positive effect on the probability that the
16 Because  virtually  all residents  of the neighborhoods  are Muslim,  very  few  are excluded  from  the mosques  or the
various  social  services  provided  by mosque  committees.  Use of the mosques  is non-rival  since  attendance  by others
does not  reduce an individual's  ability  to participate.
17 These  two  variables  are measured  with  some  error since  we measure  the age of an organization  as the earliest  date at
which  one  of our  respondents  joined. This  means  that  we only  know  the approximate  age of an organization  if one  of
our respondents  is a member.  If the organization  exists  but no member  of our sample  belongs  to it, we cannot  count  it
since  we do not know if it was created  before  the VSWM  system. In addition,  when  there  are multiple  organizations  of
the same  type  (e.g.,  sports  clubs)  in  a neighborhood  the data do not allow  us  to distinguish  between  them  and thus only
14neighborhood organizes a VSWM system because homeowners are likely to be more permanent residents,
suggesting that they will be more willing to invest in neighborhood quality.  In addition, homeowners may
want to protect their investment by supporting a trash disposal scheme since a cleaner neighborhood will
have higher housing values.  The share of neighborhood residents working in business
18 was constructed
based on the occupation of all adult (>21yrs) members of respondent households. Social ties play an
important role in the Dhaka business community. These could have a significant effect on cooperation for
trash disposal if the share of neighborhood residents working in business is high. The effect of the business
community on the development of a VSWM system will be negative if the community tends to operate
exclusively, as in the examples cited by Olson (1965). It will be positive if the community's social ties and
experience foster problem solving.
The share of neighborhood residents working in business is also used to explain trust, reciprocity
and sharing in the social capital regressions because of the importance of social networks to performance in
the Dhaka business community. Median per capita income is also included as an explanatory variable in the
social capital regressions because we expect that reciprocal social relationships insure individuals against
risk and that higher income individuals have a lesser need to insure in this manner.
An important empirical issue in the 2SCML estimation is the availability of instruments to identify
the social capital variables, distinct from cooperation for public good provision, and vice versa.  We have
identified three variables that we believe are closely associated with social capital and do not independently
affect the probability of cooperation except through social capital. The first of these is the median tenure of
residents in the neighborhood, measured by responses to the household portion of the questionnaire.  As
social relationships develop over time, norms of interaction develop as well and the potential for beneficial
reciprocal arrangements to arise can increase. We believe that the effect that length of relationships between
neighborhood residents has on their propensity to cooperate in public good provision operates almost
exclusively through the development of social norms-social  capital.  We also believe that, after controlling
for the horizontal ties that characterize civic associations (through the indicators for numbers of pre-existing
private and public neighborhood associations), the three measures of social capital are defined broadly
enough to capture most of the effect of tenure on cooperation through social capital.
The second variable to identify social capital is a measure of neighborhood infrastructure that
facilitates social interaction: the number of community centers, clubs, fields and meeting places in the
neighborhood. These facilities provide the location for the kind of casual social interaction that Putnam
(1993, 1995) argues is vital to building strong social ties.  We posit that it is through these interactions that
neighborhood infrastructure bolsters cooperation.
the oldest  is counted.  This  said,  we  think  the errors  are unlikely  to lead to a serious  undercount  and  we have  proceeded
to use  these  variables  as measures  of associational  activity.
la  As opposed  to occupations  classified  as professional,  government  or private  service,  or other.
15Finally, our data includes the proportion of neighborhood residents that originate from different
regions of Bangladesh. Individuals from the Chittagong district in Bangladesh are known to have strong
social norms that favor sharing and reciprocity. Therefore, we include a dummy variable in the social
capital regressions for whether the Chittagong district is the region with the highest share of resident origin.
The probability of cooperation for formation of a VSWM system is identified by the share of
homeowners, the number of households in the neighborhood and median education levels, as discussed
above.  We could not think of a credible argument as to why these variables would directly foster social
capital. For example, while the number of households in the neighborhood affects the probability of
reaching a threshold number of VSWM system participants, respondents are likely to answer questions
regarding trust and reciprocity between their neighbors in terms of those living nearby.  As a result, the size
of the neighborhood is not directly relevant.
Omitted Quality of Municipal Trash Disposal Services
We do not observe the quality of municipal trash disposal services before any VSWM systems were
formed, which raises the concern that the neighborhoods that formed a VSWM system were simply those
with low quality of municipal trash services. This omitted variable also biases our estimates of the role of
social capital in VSWM system development. If this bias is large and positive, it calls into question the
interpretation of our results if estimation identifies positive effects of social capital on VSWM system
formation. We can eliminate both of these concerns.
Our survey data provide evidence that trash accumulation remains a major problem in
neighborhoods without a VSWM system and that there is considerable interest in addressing the problem
through local cooperation. Respondents to our survey were asked to rank the top three "major problems
encountered by the neighborhood," in 17 categories including irregular disposal of trash, inadequate clean
water, irregular electricity supply, thuggery, thievery, noise pollution, deteriorating roads, and lack of
sewers, among others.  In neighborhoods with a VSWM system this variable provides an ex post indicator of
the severity of the neighborhood trash problem. This precludes us from using this measure as an indicator of
the quality of municipal neighborhood trash collection services in estimation. However, 51% of survey
respondents from the 30 neighborhoods without a VSWM system listed regularity of trash disposal among
the top three neighborhood problems, suggesting that it remains a serious problem in these neighborhoods.
In the 35 neighborhoods with a VSWM system, only 12% of respondents listed trash collection among the
top three problems.  In addition, respondents were asked to rank the top three problems needing to be
addressed through organized community action.  Here, 67% of the respondents from neighborhoods without
a VSWM system listed irregular trash collection among the top three problems and 45% ranked it as the
highest priority for community action. There appears to be a high level of individual interest in solving the
trash problem in these neighborhoods, but no community-organized  trash disposal scheme has developed.
16Next we determine whether the bias from omitted municipal trash collection services contributes to
the effects of norms of reciprocity and sharing found below.  Consider the regression for the probability that
a neighborhood organizes a VSWM system if the quality of municipal trash collection services, Q,, were
observed:
(8)  yi  = Y'  +  X2  + Qd+u,  i  =,...,n
yi=I  if  Y*  >°
Yi = 0  otherwise.
Following the results of Yatchew and Griliches (1985) concerning specification errors in the probit model, if
Qi given Yi  and Xi is normally distributed, the probit estimator for thejth  social capital variable, yj,  will
converge asymptotically to
(9)  J-22  +2  .5
2cT
2 ±o-al
where  ai  is the coefficient of the jth  social capital variable in a least squares regression of Qi on social
capital, Yi,  and all other regressors from (8), X20, and where  a2 is the variance of the error term from this
regression.  The second term in the numerator of (9) is identical to the effect of bias from an omitted
variable in least squares.  The difference in the probit case is the assumption regarding the conditional
distribution of Qi and the scale factor in the denominator.'9 Since the denominator must be positive, the sign
of the bias is given by sign(a)  *  sign(aj).  The first component of this bias is negative, since better
municipal services reduce the probability of neighborhood residents organizing a VSWM system. We argue
that the effect of social capital on the quality of municipal trash collection services is positive since stronger
norms of reciprocity and sharing will improve the quality of neighborhood lobbying efforts for more regular
municipal trash pick-up. Therefore, the overall effect of omitted municipal trash collection services is a
downward bias in the social capital coefficients, so that the marginal effects presented below represent a
lower bound on the true effect of social capital on the probability of VSWM formation.
'9 Yatchew  and Griliches  (1985)  derive  and  implicit  expression  for the bias if  the distribution  of Qi  given Yi  and  Xi is not
normal. In this case,  (9) serves  as an approximation  to the bias,  the accuracy  of which  depends  on the third  and  higher
order  moments  of the conditional  distribution  of Qi.
177.  Results
(i)  Social capital
Parameter estimates of the social capital regressions are presented in Table 3.  The measures of
trust, reciprocity and sharing served as the dependent variables in these regressions. Explanatory variables
in each social capital regression include cooperation for creation of a VSWM system 20, the number of pre-
existing private-good-  and public-good-oriented  civic associations, median tenure of residents in the
neighborhood, predominance of residents from Chittagong, share of residents that are homeowners, share of
business among neighborhood occupations, and the number of community social facilities.  Determinants of
social capital were estimated first by least squares (Columns 1-3) since preliminary Hausman tests failed to
reject the  exogeneity of the presence of a VSWM system in each of the three regressions. 2'
Because the low number of neighborhood observations in our sample weakens the precision of
parameter estimates, we use the inverse power function (Andrews 1989) to interpret the failure of the
Hausman test to reject exogeneity. 22 Results show that the power of our Hausman tests is very weak in this
setting; the probability of type II error is greater than 50%, so we conclude that our Hausman tests are
uninformative. To avoid biased parameter estimates, we re-estimate equations (5.a) assuming the VSWM
system dummy is endogenous and treating the endogeneity using the 2SLS approach of Amemiya (1978).
These results are presented in Columns 4-6 of Table 3.
The strength of cooperation for development of a VSWM system contributes significantly to the
creation of all three measures of social capital in both OLS and modified 2SLS estimation.  In each case, the
parameter estimates fall using the 2SLS approach, as would be expected were VSWM system presence
simultaneously determined with social capital. The significance of the trash schemes is somewhat surprising
given that in most cases they only started operation less than three years before the survey. Nonetheless, the
process of developing community-organized  trash removal fosters stronger social ties.  This suggests a
qualified, though mostly benign, role for policy. By eliminating barriers to cooperation for public good
provision, and perhaps through limited incentives (such as tax rebates), the government may encourage
community activity, and the resultant strengthening of social networks may have a variety of benefits.
Table 3.  Determinants of Social Capital
20 In the OLS  regressions,  latent  cooperation  for  creation  of a VSWM  system  is proxied  by the dummy  variable  for
VSWM  system  presence.  In the 2SLS  regressions,  a consistent  estimate  of the structural  parameter  on latent
cooperation  is recovered  by regressing  reduced  form  parameters  from  the appropriate  social  capital  regression  in (5.a')
on the reduced  form  parameters  from  (5.b') and  the selection  matrix  J,.  This  method  of recovering  the parameter
estimate  for the latent  endogenous  variable  is the heart of Amemiya's  approach.
21 T-statistics  for the exogeneity  tests  are presented  in  the last  row of Table  3.
22 The  results  of the inverse  power  function  tests  are presented  in  Note A.3 of Appendix  A.
18Dependent Variable  NH Trust  NH  NH  NH Trust  NH  NH
Reciprocity  Sharing  Reciprocity  Sharing
OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS
Intercept  11.9247  52.7270**  46.0349**  17.7075**  56.3214**  51.9712**
(8.2502)  (5.9775)  (6.9728)  (8.2170)  (5.8210)  (6.5050)
Cooperation for creation of  8.2260*  5.5647*  7.3821**  4.1002**  2.2244*  4.7258**
VSWM System  (4.1449)  (3.0031)  (3.5032)  (1.9260)  (1.3110)  (1.5530)
Number of meeting places  -6.8949**  3.5244**  0.5670  -8.5277**  2.7408*  -1  .5457
(1.9171)  (1.3890)  (1.6202)  (2.1940)  (1.5410)  (1.7430)
Median tenure of respondents  0.2691*  0.2358**  0.2080*  0.3852**  0.2927**  0.3569**
(0.1456)  (0.1055)  (0.1231)  (0.1652)  (0.1154)  (0.1317)
Chittagong district plurality  6.6374  8.2975**  12.8974**  2.2784  6.3418  7.0234
(4.4832)  (3.2482)  (3.7890)  (5.3630)  (3.8280)  (4.2310)
Share of workers in business  0.3411*  0.3210**  0.4897**  0.3298*  0.3146**  0.4742**
(0.1867)  (0.1353)  (0.1578)  (0.1894)  (0.1334)  (0.1503)
Median per capita income  -0.0021  -0.0001  -0.0011  -0.0025*  -0.0003  -0.0016
(0.0014)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)
Pre-existing private civic  2.9501  0.1043  2.2266  6.5404  1.7626  7.0072*
associations
(4.1644)  (3.0172)  (3.5196)  (4.7910)  (3.4080)  (3.7860)
Pre-existing public civic  1.5374  -1.9891  -1.0294  0.0474  -2.6928  -2.9991
associations
(2.4777)  (1.7952)  (2.0941)  (2.6490)  (1.8910)  (2.0900)
Adj. R  0.2525  0.2223  0.2541  0.2979  0.2847  0.4019
N  65  65  65  65  65  65
T-stat for exogeneity test  1.147  0.468  1.186
Standard  errors  in  parenthesis."
* Significant  at 10%
**  Significant  at  5%
Both the share of adults working in business and the tenure of neighborhood residents are positively
and significantly associated with all three measures of social capital. The strong effect of the business
community verifies the important role of social ties in business in Dhaka.  It is not possible to determine
whether this effect is derived from the strength of social networks within the business community or whether
members of the business community foster greater trust and norms of reciprocity in their relationships with
other community members, including those not involved in business.
Neighborhoods with a majority of residents originating from Chittagong district demonstrate
stronger norms of reciprocity and sharing in the least squares regressions as their reputation suggests.
However, this effect is removed in the two-stage estimation procedure with endogenous cooperation for
trash removal.  Surprisingly, the number of community social facilities and meeting places builds norms of
reciprocity, but is also negatively associated with trust.  It is unlikely that this variable is a proxy for the
level of development, since these regressions control for income. It appears that the types of activities that
19take place in these facilities encourage reciprocal exchanges, and that trust most probably arises from deeper
relationships and interactions.
Per capita income demonstrates only a weak negative effect on the level of trust among
neighborhood residents in the 2SLS results. Earlier, we posited a negative role for income, but primarily
regarding reciprocity which acts as a form of insurance.  The negative coefficient on trust must be
interpreted with some care, since very low and very high income neighborhoods were not included in our
sample because neither is likely to have a VSWM system. Still, among middle income neighborhoods, an
increase in income appears to be associated with declines in trust among respondents.
It is interesting to note that participation in civic associations is not associated, in general, with
increased trust or stronger norms of reciprocity and sharing. The only exception is some effect of privately
oriented clubs (sports and women's associations) in encouraging sharing of resources. To the uninitiated the
weak results for civic associations appear to offer a rejection of Putnam's hypothesis that the kind of social
ties developed in such associations is an important contributor to social capital.  However, it is likely that
formal membership in groups, which has been demonstrated to be a significant determinant of social capital
in Putnam's studies of the US and Italy, is not as important as other, more casual, forms of associational
activity in Dhaka.
(ii)  Existence of a VSWM system
The results of the estimation of the 2SCML regression for the formation of a VSWM system in the
neighborhood are presented in Table 4. We estimate this probit using each of the three contemporaneous
measures of social capital as regressors in separate equations and then estimate the probit again including all
three measures in the same regression.  The marginal effects of the regressors on the probability that a
neighborhood will develop a VSWM system are presented in Table 5. The reduced form regressions used to
generate the  Vi terms are presented in Appendix Table B3.
The 2SCML estimates presented in Table 4 were obtained using the Rivers and Vuong (1988)
approach to consistent estimation of the probit with simultaneously determined regressors, modified by the
Manski and Lerman (1977) correction for choice-based samples. 24 The Wald statistic (Rivers and Vuong
23 The standard  errors  presented  for the 2SLS  regressions  in Table  3 are  those resulting  from  the variance-covariance
matrix  derived  by Amemiya  (1978),  with  the modification  that  the covariance  of residuals  from reduced  form
regressions  for  social  capital  and cooperation  was calculated  using  the method  described  by Heckman  (1978).
24 The 99 neighborhoods  identified  before  sampling  represent  the population  that is relevant  for analysis. Fifty-five  of
these  have  a VSWM  system. Using  the choice  based  sampling  approach,  samples  were drawn  independently  from
within  the strata  defined  by presence  of a VSWM. Thirty-five  neighborhoods  with  a VSWM  system  were drawn  and  30
neighborhoods  were  drawn  without  a VSWM  system,  for  a sample  of 65 neighborhoods.  In the sample  correction
procedure,  the contribution  of each  neighborhood  to the likelihood  function  is weighted  by the ratio of the population
fraction  to the sample  fraction  that  have  (do not have)  a VSWM  system  for neighborhoods  with  (without)  such  a scheme.
20(1988)) used to test for the exogeneity of social capital variables in the cooperation regression rejects
exogeneity in each case, implying that the use of the 2SCML technique to obtain consistent parameter
estimates is justified.  The estimation results show that the largest and most significant effect from a single
social capital variable on the probability that a VSWM system will be formed is due to the strength of norms
of reciprocity.
The marginal effects in Table 5 show that a 1% increase in the reciprocity index leads to a 2.8%
increase in the probability that a VSWM system  will form.  Social capital indeed appears to have a major
effect on cooperation for public good provision. The fact that of the three measures of social capital
reciprocity has the greatest impact is consistent with the idea that reciprocity best represents the relationship
underlying the phenomenon of organizing for SWM in the neighborhood.
Norms of sharing also have a significant positive effect on the probability of a VSWM system being
formed. The effect of the sharing variable is nearly as large as that of reciprocity with a 1% increase in the
index of sharing norms leading to a 2.1% increase in the probability that a VSWM system will form. 25 Trust
on the other hand is not an important determinant of VSWM system formation. The marginal effect of trust
is -0.0005, but the parameter estimate for trust in the 2SCML estimation is not significant.  We conjecture
that the relatively low stakes involved, and the transactional nature of coordinated action for solid waste
disposal may mean that trust between neighbors is not particularly important for setting up such systems.
Once created, the VSWM are relatively inexpensive  to maintain with average monthly costs of 30 cents per
household, so trust that other founding members will not later renege on their commitment is not a
significant determinant of initial cooperation. Commonality of interests, as captured by reciprocity, may
well be all that is required.
When the social capital variables are included together as regressors, the strength of the effect of
social capital on the probability that a VSWM system exists disappears. This may be due to
multicollinearity among these measures. Indeed, the correlation between reciprocity and sharing is 0.62,
that between reciprocity and trust is 0.37 and that for trust and sharing is 0.44.
As a result of the sampling  procedure  used,  neighborhoods  with  a VSWM  system  received  a slightly  higher  weight  in  the
estimation  than  those  without. (The  weights  for neighborhoods  with  and  without  a VSWM  system  were 1.0317  and
0.9630,  respectively).  Thus,  while  the parameter  estimates  presented  in Table  4 are purged  of sample  selection  bias,
neighborhoods  with  VSWM  systems  are overrepresented  in our  analysis.
25Keep in  mind  that  the strong  effects  of norms  of reciprocity  and sharing  on the probability  of public  good  provision
found  here  represent  a lower  bound  on  these  effects  because  of the downward  bias introduced  by omitted  quality  of
municipal  trash collection  services. The  true effects  of social  capital  on public  good  provision  in this case  are at least as
large  as presented  here.
21Table  4.  Two-Stage  Conditional  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates
for Presence  of VSWM  System
Independent  variables  Model  I  Model  II  Model  III  Model  IV
Neighborhood  Trust  -0.0020  -0.1329
(0.0247)  (0.1530)
Neighborhood  Reciprocity  0.1278**  -0.1104
(0.0476)  (0.3649)
Neighborhood  Sharing  0.0895**  0.2839
(0.0349)  (0.3687)
Intercept  -6.8459**  -16.2107**  -9.4790**  -12.1357
(2.5145)  (4.6220)  (3.1125)  (12.5163)
Share  of hownowners  0.0683*  0.0148  -0.0108  -0.0181
(0.0407)  (0.0506)  (0.0505)  (0.1201)
Number  of HH  in Neighborhood  0.0003  -0.0002  0.0004  0.0013
(0.0006)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0027)
Median  education  0.5399**  0.7784**  0.4584**  0.5404
(0.1875)  (0.2466)  (0.2089)  (0.6338)
Share  of workers  in business  0.0033  -0.0265  -0.0328  -0.0455
(0.0209)  (0.0251)  (0.0252)  (0.0614)
Median  per capita  income  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0003
(0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)
Pre-existing  private  civic  -0.9411**  -1.6472**  -1.5939**  -2.2634*
associations
(0.4312)  (0.5995)  (0.5850)  (1.2801)
Pre-existing  public  civic  0.4949  0.7958**  0.5737  0.8245
associations
(0.2969)  (0.3725)  (0.3493)  (0.8905)
0.0200  0.1454
TRUST  (0.0289)  (0.1528)
-0.0806  0.1376
RECIP  (0.0503)  (0.3687)
-0.0606  -0.2583
VSHARE  (0.0382)  (0.3698)
N  65  65  65  65
Modified  Wald  stat. for  31.81  191.44  184.00  309.03
exogeneity  of social  capital
Standard  errors  in parenthesis. 26
* Significant  at 10%
** Significant  at 5%
The median level of average household education in the neighborhood is also strongly related to the
likelihood of a VSWM system coming into being in Models I-HI. This suggests that education plays a role
in raising awareness about the benefits of cleaner surroundings or about the indirect benefits from this type
26 Standard  errors  are taken  from  the formulation  of the variance-covariance  matrix  for  2SCML  estimator  in Rivers  and
Vuong  (1988),  modified  by the weights  used to correct  for bias  from choice  based  sampling.
22of cooperation. Median per capita income is not significantly associated with the existence of VSWM
systems at standard significance levels. 27
Table 5:  Average Marginal Effects on Probability that
Neighborhood Develops a VSWM System
Independent variables  Model I  Model II  Model m  Model IV
Neighborhood Trust  -0.0005  -0.0265
Neighborhood Reciprocity  0.0277  -0.0220
Neighborhood Sharing  0.0210  0.0566
Intercept  -1.8437  -3.5167  -2.2197  -2.4188
Share of homeowners  0.0184  0.0032  -0.0025  -0.0036
Number of households in  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  0.0003
Neighborhood
Median education  0.1454  0.1689  0.1074  0.1077
Share of workers in business  0.0009  -0.0057  -0.0077  -0.0091
Median per capita income  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001
Pre-existing private civic  -0.2535  -0.3573  -0.3732  -0.4511
associations
Pre-existing public civic  0.1333  0.1726  0.1344  0.1643
associations
The share of neighborhood residents that own their home has a significant effect on cooperation
only in Model II. This result provides some evidence for the argument that homeowners are more likely to
make investments in their neighborhoods. There are no significant effects of neighborhood size on the
probability that a VSWM system will form, suggesting that strong coordination advantages are not available
to smaller neighborhoods; nor are there benefits to having a larger pool of potential participants to choose
from. Or perhaps these two effects are offsetting, making it difficult to identify the relationship between
neighborhood size and the prospects for coordinated action for public good provision. The share of adults in
respondent households working in business is also not a significant determinant of VSWM system
forrnation. Although a large population of residents with a business occupation was shown to contribute to
social capital above, occupation appears to have no independent effect on the organization of SWM systems.
Most intriguing was the strong negative effect of the number of private-good-oriented
organizations on the existence of VSWM systems, while the effect of the number of public-good-oriented
associations is positive and significant only in Model II. This may imply a sort of displacement or crowding
out effect whereby the orientation of the "private" group militates against more publicly oriented activity. It
is worth repeating that these variables count the number of groups or associations that existed prior to the
27 However,  because  the sign  on income  is negative  in all four regressions  and income  is marginally  significant  in
regressions  using  only  trust  or reciprocity  as social  capital  (with  p-values  of 11.7%  and 10.6%,  respectively),  there  is
some  evidence  of a negative  effect  of neighborhood  income  on VSWM  system  formation  for this  population  of middle-
income  neighborhoods,  possibly  reflecting  better  municipal  service  quality  in higher  income  neighborhoods.
23formation of a VSWM system, and are therefore predetermined. Clearly it isn't  only that associational
activity matters, but also that the type of associational activity is important.
8.  Conclusions
This paper has presented the results of a micro-empirical survey-based study of households in 65
neighborhoods of Dhaka.  Our results indicate that the organization of VSWM systems is a function of our
proxy for social capital and of measures of associational activity, as well as the nature of such activity.  Our
results show that the different proxies we have used for social capital - trust, reciprocity and sharing - do,
indeed, capture different aspects of social capital, with quite different impacts on community outcomes.
Reciprocity among neighbors is far more important when it comes to cooperating for solid waste
management than trust, for instance.
A clear policy implication of the analysis is that investments in education are likely to have spillover
effects in terms of the ability to organize for SWM.  However, we cannot say whether or not the promotion
of associational activity (as has been mooted by proponents of the role of social capital in development
following Putnam) has a positive net impact on the provision of a public good or service by a neighborhood
committee - either directly or through higher social capital. We need also to remember the insight of
Beall's (1997) case studies, that the nature of the good or service, and the circumstances of its
underprovision are critical in determining the utility of greater associational activity.
The different aspects of social capital also appear to be enhanced by the formation of a VSWM
system. The implication of this result for policy is not easy to decipher.  Because the process by which
community residents agree to cooperate for provision of trash removal is a function of the strength of their
relationships, it is unlikely that any direct attempt by government to initiate this process will be successful in
boosting social capital. However, given that the presence of a VSWM system has a significant independent
effect on social capital development, even after controlling for past participation in civic associations,
limited policies that encourage community participation in public good provision by lowering information
and transaction costs may contribute to a virtuous cycle of successful cooperation and strengthening social
ties.
The most important policy implication of our work is that the introduction of public-private
partnerships or self-help schemes is more likely to be successful in neighborhoods which are high in social
capital.  Thus social capital proxies or determinants can be used as predictors of success when targeting
neighborhoods for different social or public-good-oriented  interventions.
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26Appendix A.  Notes on estimation
(A.1)  It is worth considering the comparability of the Rivers and Vuong (1988) estimator for the
simultaneous equations probit in (5.b) to the Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978) estimators. The
comparison provides an intuitive understanding of why the Rivers and Vuong estimator yields consistent
parameter estimates of y and P3.
First, after adding the term VJ (estimated by  J') to (5.b) as in (6), if y + X  = 0  and A # 0 (6)
becomes
(6.a)  Y; = X2iJ3  + X,tlA  + 7ih-
This is identical to the instrumental variables approach to estimation of a discrete choice simultaneous
equations system of Heckman (1978) in which Yi (m x 1) is replaced by its predicted value. However,
dropping these restrictions, we can rewrite (6) as
(6.b)  Y  = Y,',u  + X'v  +  7,,
where  P=r+  A  and v = J2 8 -f2  . In matrix notation,
y  = Yp  + Xv  +  ,
where y  is an n x 1 vector, Y and X are n x m  and  n x p  matrices, respectively, and the parameters  .t and
v are just as before. Premultiplying  by (XX)'  X',
(6.c)  (XXYX x>  = (XX)}'  XTj  + v + 77.
GLS estimation of (6.c) will recover consistent estimates of iL  and v.  Let y4 = f'X  + o  be the reduced
form cooperation regression.  Then, substituting for reduced form parameter estimates and v, we have
1i =Inp+J28-12+ 7 1 ,
which can be simplified as
(6.d)  fl = lr+  J2 8 + 77
This is identical to the equation used by Amemiya to recover consistent estimates of the structural
parameters from reduced form parameter estimates for the discrete choice simultaneous equations system.
Amemiya's approach involved GLS estimation of (6.d) where q7  =  (I1-  [  - y(h  - II).  Amemiya's
estimator in (6.d) is identical to the Rivers and Vuong estimator in (6), transformed by premultiplication by
(xx) 1' X'.
(A.2)  One of the benefits of the 2SCML method for estimating the cooperation equation (5.b) is that it
27provides a simple method for testing exogeneity of the social capital variables in this equation.  Substituting
for V; in equation (6) and gathering terms,
y  =Ytu+X 1 i6+XTIA2+  i7,
where ,u =  y +  2.  This is the form of regression typically used to perform a Hausman test for exogeneity of
regressors in which the potentially endogenous variables are included along with their predicted values.  A
test of the null hypothesis of exogeneity is equivalent to testing whether A = 0.  Rivers and Vuong (1988)
show that, under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the modified Wald statistic given by
MW  = nA'Vt4  A
has an asymptotic central chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables in
Yi.
(A.3)  We used Andrews' (1989) inverse power function to investigate the power properties of the
Hausman test for exogeneity of VSWM system presence in the social capital regressions.  The test of the
null hypothesis of exogeneity is the test Ho:  9 = 0  versus H1 :  : 9  0, where 0 is the parameter estimate
for the predicted presence of a VSWM system in a regression of a single social capital equation from (5.a)
that includes the VSWM system dummy and predicted VSWM system presence as right-hand-side variables.
Andrews defines a region of high probability of type II error as {9 : 0 < I0I  <  b}.  Here, b = 2a (1/  2)&,
where A  (1  / 2)  is the test statistic for the inverse power function for one parameter restriction at
significance level a and p=1/2 and cr  is a consistent standard error estimate for 9.  If the exogeneity test
fails to reject the null, no conclusions can be drawn about parameter estimates in this region since the
probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis is greater than the probability of rejecting it for parameter
values in this region.
Table A. 1 presents the parameter estimates and standard errors for predicted VSWM system
formation in the social capital regressions, as well as the corresponding measures of b evaluated at a=.05.
We find that the estimate of predicted VSWM formation lies within the critical region for each of the three
social capital regressions, suggesting that the probability of type II error in the Hausman tests is high. As a
result, we present two-stage estimates of the social capital regressions in Columns 4-6 of Table 3 assuming
VSWM system formation is endogenous and correcting for the bias.
28Table A.1  Inverse Power Function Test for Region of High
Probability of Type II Error in Hausman Tests
°si  ao  Ao05 (1/ 2)  b
Neighborhood Trust  10.650  9.282  1.960  18.193
Neighborhood Reciprocity  3.176  6.791  1.960  13.310
Neighborhood Sharing  9.293  7.838  1.960  15.362
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Table B1.  Matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients
Variable  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.
1.  Presence of VSWM system  1.00
2.  Neighborhood trust  0.21  1.00
3.  Neighborhood reciprocity  0.23  0.37  1.00
4.  Neighborhood sharing  0.30  0.44  0.62  1.00
5.  Past private civic assoc.  -0.28  0.00  0.11  0.09  1.00
6.  Past public civic assoc.  0.11  0.21  0.06  0.16  0.21  1.00
7.  Share of homeowners  0.29  0.25  0.22  0.39  -0.27  0.15  1.00
8.  Number HHs in neighborhood  0.05  0.01  0.08  -0.04  0.22  0.23  -0.28  1.00
9.  Chittagong district dummy  0.44  0.22  0.17  0.33  -0.14  0.09  0.17  -0.09  1.00
10.  Share of workers in business  -0.26  0.13  0.17  0.18  0.27  0.20  -0.18  0.09  -0.48  1.00
11.  Median education  0.31  -0.01  -0.09  -0.01  0.03  -0.24  -0.10  0.29  0.24  -0.38  1.00
12.  Median per capita income  -0.12  -0.15  -0.03  -0.13  0.16  -0.15  -0.31  0.34  -0.12  0.06  0.46  1.00
13.  Number ofmeeting  places  0.03  -0.35  0.31  0.06  0.27  0.08  -0.03  0.13  -0.17  0.10  -0.16  -0.06  1.00
14.  Mediantenureofresidents  -0.30  0.12  0.22  0.12  0.32  0.17  0.04  0.02  -0.30  0.30  -0.39  0.10  0.15  1.00
30Table B2.  First-stage probit to predict EXIST
Dep. Var.: Presence of VSWM  Estimate  Standard  Wald  Prob
Sytem*  Error  Chi-Square
Intercept  -10.3533  3.2219  10.3259  0.0013
Share  of residents  that  are  0.0800  0.042  3.6376  0.0565
homeowners
Number  of households  in  0.000336  0.000699  0.2311  0.6307
neighborhood
Median  education  of adults  in  0.6488  0.2297  7.9790  0.0047
respondent  households
Number  of centers,  clubs,  fields,  0.6492  0.2926  4.9224  0.0265
and  meeting  places  in neighborhood
Median  number  of years  respondents  -0.0157  0.023  0.4693  0.4933
lived  in neighborhood
Dummy  for whether  Chittagong  is  1.6109  0.5648  8.1339  0.0043
district  with  highest  share
Share  of respondents  working  0.0376  0.0259  2.1160  0.1458
in business
Median  monthly  per capita income  -0.00023  0.000232  0.9576  0.3278
of respondents  (in Taka)
Past private  civic  associations  -1.6056  0.6103  6.9218  0.0085
Past  public  civic  associations  0.5346  0.3444  2.4093  0.1206
*N=65.
31Table  B3:  First-Stage  Reduced  Form  Regressions
Dep Var:  Trust  Dep Var:  Reciprocity  Dep Var:  Sharing
R2:  0.3691  R2:  0.3509  R2:  0.4594
adjR2:  0.2522  adjR2:  0.2307  adjR2:  0.3593
Variable  Estim  StdErr  tstat  Prob  Estim  StdErr  Tstat  Prob  Estim  StdErr  tstat  Prob
Intercept  -22.1479  19.8781  -1.114  0.2701  36.4275  14.3210  2.544  0.0139  4.1457  15.5669  0.266  0.7910
Share of homeowners  0.5599  0.3200  1.750  0.0858  0.5155  0.2305  2.236  0.0295  0.8893  0.2506  3.549  0.0008
Number of households  0.0053  0.0060  0.886  0.3793  0.0053  0.0043  1.232  0.2231  0.0017  0.0047  0.355  0.7242
Median education  1.7404  1.5337  1.135  0.2615  0.1835  1.1050  0.166  0.8687  1.6175  1.2011  1.347  0.1837
Number meeting places  -6.1693  1.9173  -3.218  0.0022  3.7893  1.3813  2.743  0.0082  1.2988  1.5015  0.865  0.3909
Median tenure  0.2718  0.1629  1.669  0.1010  0.1849  0.1174  1.576  0.1209  0.1681  0.1276  1.318  0.1931
Chittagongplurality  9.1043  4.2515  2.141  0.0368  10.1604  3.0629  3.317  0.0016  14.4872  3.3294  4.351  0.0001
Share workers in  0.4666  0.1988  2.347  0.0226  0.3747  0.1433  2.616  0.0115  0.6327  0.1557  4.063  0.0002
business
Median  per cap. Income  -0.0030  0.0018  -1.691  0.0966  -0.0001  0.0013  -0.065  0.9484  -0.0012  0.0014  -0.869  0.3886
Past private civic assoc.  1.1347  4.3309  0.262  0.7943  -0.0635  3.1202  -0.020  0.9838  2.2003  3.3916  0.649  0.5193
Past public civic assoc.  1.2347  2.6855  0.460  0.6475  -2.8008  1.9348  -1.448  0.1535  -1.3946  2.1031  -0.663  0.5101
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